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Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs (2007) sketch a theory of free will as the human 
ability to exert self-control. Self-control can produce goal-directed behavior, which free 
will conceptualized as random behavior cannot. We question whether consumer 
psychology can shed light on the ontological question of whether free will exists. We 
suggest that it is more fruitful for consumer psychology to examine consumers’ belief in 
free will. Specifically, we propose that this belief arises from consumers’ 
phenomenological experience of exercising self-control in the face of moral or 
intertemporal conflicts of will. Based on extant literature in philosophy, psychology, and 
economics, we offer both a narrower conceptualization of the nature of self-control 
problems and a more general conceptualization of self-control strategies, involving not 
only willpower but also precommitment. We conclude with a discussion of the 
consequences of consumers’ belief in free will.
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When Adam and Eve succumbed to the serpent’s temptation to eat the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, thus committing the original sin, they acquired two things, 
consciousness of good and evil and responsibility for choosing among them. Both consciousness 
and responsibility imply free will, with which God had endowed Adam and Eve. So the 
existence of free will has been linked to consciousness and to the ability to resist temptation from 
the earliest moments of Judaeo-Christian tradition and is also reflected in most other religious 
beliefs about man’s place in the world. Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs (2007, hereafter 
BSSV) sketch a theory of free will that closely resembles this Judaeo-Christian conception of 
free will. Specifically, BSSV suggest that free will represents an “evolutionary adaptation” that 
enables “human beings to behave in self-controlled and rationally intelligent ways” (p. 12), a 
characterization that reflects responsibility and consciousness. BSSV derive the notion of free 
will from empirical evidence of conscious, deliberative (system 2) choice processes and of 
people’s attempts to control their automatic (system 1) impulses (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick,
2002; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006).
We question whether such empirical evidence has any implications for whether free will 
really exists from an ontological point of view. Religion or any other system of ethical beliefs 
with a focus on moral choices may necessitate the existence of free will. Philosophy, however, 
has been characterized by raging debates about the existence of free will for more than two 
thousand years. We do not believe that (consumer) psychology as an empirical social science can 
shed light on the question of whether free will exists and hence relegate this question to where it 
came from, to ontology. We do so by invoking the contrast between free will and determinism. 
Originating from Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, causal determinism in philosophy and 
physics posits that a specific set of antecedents necessitates one and only one set of 
consequences, even though no human being (or machine) may have the requisite skills to analyze 
the contingency that is ultimately based on complex laws of nature (Earman, 1986; Laplace, 
1814; Vihvelin, 2003), laws such as biochemical principles that govern neurological activity.
1  
Thus, the notion of causal determinism precludes the operation of free will (Clarke, 1995; 
O’Connor, 1995).
                                                
1 However, ontological determinism is not, as it is often portrayed, a prerequisite for the scientific 
endeavor. For example, in quantum physics the outcome of measuring the momentum of an electron that 
is in a state of superposition is indeterminate, that is, each measurement outcome is equiprobable (Sklar, 
1992). Among physicists, this indeterminism is widely accepted as ontological.3
Rather than taking sides in an ontological debate to (dis)prove the existence of free will, 
we believe it is more fruitful for consumer psychologists to focus on the belief in free will, on its 
origins and on its effects on consumer behavior. So in contrast to BSSV, we prefer to decouple 
the ontological question (what do we know?) of whether free will exists from the epistemological 
question (how do we know it?) of whether and why human beings (i.e., consumers) believe in its 
existence. We broadly agree with BSSV that the belief in free will is rooted in consumers’
phenomenological experience of consciousness, preferences and trade-offs, and willpower and 
self-control. Our central thesis, however, is more circumspect—the antecedents of the belief in 
free will lie specifically in consumers’ experience of willpower and precommitment in the face 
of temptation. Believing in free will provides consumers with essential benefits—if the choice 
between good and evil is left up to us, then we are free to choose virtue and to hope for 
redemption or, in terms more suited to a materialistic consumer society, for a better world. 
Hence, the notion of free will allows us to work for, and anticipate, a better life and greater 
happiness. It is needed to experience accomplishment, autonomy, dignity, and even love and 
friendship (Kane, 1996; Clarke, 2003). Finally, belief in free will and its concomitant sense of 
self-efficacy may even have important implications for organizing economic systems and 
redistribution in society (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005)
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS: FREE WILL AND (IN)DETERMINISM
BSSV note that many philosophers now regard free will as compatible with determinism, 
yet that many scientists and psychologists find the two incompatible. In particular, to study 
behavior scientifically, empirical psychologists assume that it is fully caused, as opposed to 
freely willed by the individual, conjuring up echoes of behaviorist conditioning. Without 
causation, the scientific study of behavior would be implausible. So the scientific assumption of 
causation (i.e., of causal determinism) leaves no room for the operation of free will in empirical 
psychology. Determinism means that every event is determined by antecedent conditions 
together with the laws of nature. If determinism is true, then we do not have free will. The 
philosophical problem of free will and determinism is the problem of understanding how, if at 
all, the (scientific) truth of determinism is compatible with the truth of our commonsense belief 
that we have free will (Vihvelin, 2003).4
To address this problem, philosophers have proposed ‘compatibilist’ and 
‘incompatibilist’ theories of free will. Compatibilist theories maintain that ontological 
determinism is compatible with the notion of freedom of action. Incompatibilist theories regard 
determinism and freedom of will as incompatible; free will requires indeterminacy. Yet the 
indeterminate free will in these incompatibilist theories produces goal-directed behavior. In other 
words, assuming indeterminacy of the will does not imply that behavior is random but rather 
allows it to be purposeful (for overviews of incompatibilist theories of free will, see Clarke, 
2005; Kane, 2002; O'Connor, 2006).
For example, Kane (1996) suggested that those choices are most relevant to our 
autonomy that involve exercising our will as part of the deliberation process. These are choices
that involve a conflict of will, where our duty or long-term self-interest competes with a more 
immediate desire. Struggling to prioritize our values, the possible outcomes of our choices are 
indeterminate: “At each stage of the struggle, the possible outcomes have no specific objective 
probability of occurring. This indeterminacy, Kane believes, is essential to freedom of will” 
(O’Connor, 2006). We propose that it is the phenomenological experience of this indeterminacy 
in conflicts of will that leads consumers to believe in free will.
Similar to philosophy, the challenge for empirical (consumer) psychology is to square its 
scientific assumption of causal determinism with this phenomenological experience of free will. 
Empirical evidence of deliberative system 2 processing does not mean that a particular set of 
psychological antecedents allows consumers to pursue more than one particular course of action.
So the empirical evidence that is obtained under the scientific assumption of causal determinism
cannot be taken as evidence of the existence of free will, except from an incompatibilist 
perspective. Perhaps this is why BSSV refrain from positing extremes of either full determinacy 
or full indeterminacy of behavior by stating that “people experience some of their actions as freer 
than others, and they make similar distinctions while perceiving the actions of others.”
However, this conceptualization of experienced freedom of action seems to confuse
freedom of action with freedom of will and belief in free will with the ontological status of free 
will (Bargh, 2007, emphasizes the necessity for any theory of free will to make these 
distinctions; cf., also O’Connor, 2006). The experienced continuum from completely determined 
behavior to total freedom describes how free people perceive actions to be. However, the 
continuum does not apply to freedom of will. Suppose, for example, that an action was produced 5
under full deliberation and absence of external constraints (e.g., time pressure). The action would 
be experienced as free. However, humans are complex biological and neurological apparatuses
subject to natural laws and thus could plausibly be seen as having no freedom of choosing among 
possible behaviors (cf. Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). Will is either 
indeterminate (but not random) or it is determinate, there is no continuum. Basing a theory of 
free will on the experience continuum does not help BSSV avoid the “metaphysical and 
epistemological pitfalls” in characterizing behavior as either completely determinate or 
indeterminate. 
BSSV’s theory of free will relies on the concept of ego-depletion, and characterizes a 
broad set of conditions under which behavior originates from deliberative, conscious processing. 
Yet these conditions do not seem to provide sufficient insight into the nature of free will. A
major problem with conceptualizing free will as conscious, deliberative, system 2 behavior is 
that social psychology has produced an abundance of findings that show how deliberative 
processing is systematically influenced by external factors outside the decision maker’s 
awareness. Bargh (1997) argues that human perception, evaluations, attitudes, and goals are 
influenced by external stimuli which largely control our behavior outside our awareness (see
also, e.g., Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005). For example, participants who 
are primed with an achievement goal perform better than those who are not (Bargh et al., 2001). 
Likewise, participants primed with a cooperation goal replenish a commonly held resource more 
readily than non-primed participants. Moreover, even higher mental processes involved in social 
interaction, judgment, and goal structures can originate from non-conscious automatic processing 
(Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). For instance, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) showed that 
initial valuations of products and simple hedonic experiences are driven by arbitrary anchors 
such as a person’s social security number. Because subsequent valuations were coherent, an 
illusion of stable underlying preferences was generated.  Since people are not aware of these 
non-conscious, automatic processes, they attribute their behavior to those aspects of reality that 
they are aware of. Reasons for behavior are thus post-hoc rationalizations. Bargh (1997) argues 
that the consciousness of these attributions provides a necessary feeling of stability and control 
and thus is adaptive, but at the ontological level, conscious system 2 processing is not sufficient 6
to prove free will (Bargh, 2007).
2 Experienced freedom of will tells us little about whether we 
have free will or not. 
Our discussion suggests that the ontological status of indeterminacy and free will is not 
resolved, and consumer psychology as an empirical social science may not be able to contribute 
to the ontological debate. Instead, we propose that the relevance of indeterminacy to consumer 
behavior lies in allowing consumers to believe in free will, as captured by Isaac B. Singer’s 
famous quote: “We must belief in free will. We have no choice.”  From an ontological
standpoint, we are not sure whether BSSV’s theory of free will provides new insights into the 
nature of free will. 
ANTECEDENTS OF BELIEF IN FREE WILL: SELF-CONTROL
Consumers’ belief in free will reflects what philosophers have called preferences among 
preferences (e.g., Elster, 1984; Frankfurt, 1971; Jeffrey, 1974). As human beings, we have the 
unique ability to reflect upon our preferences. What suggests to us that we have free will is not 
that we are aware of our preferences (which economists assume to be exogenous and 
psychologists often derive from system 1 impulses) and that we can make reasoned tradeoffs 
between them (system 2 processing, sometimes under the influence of system 1); in fact, 
animals, to which human beings do not accord free will, make tradeoffs, exhibit goal-directed 
behavior, and solve problems just like us (e.g., Köhler, 1925). Rather, it is the fact that we can 
evaluate our preferences and act according to these evaluations. For instance, imagine a smoker 
who, when offered a cigarette, prefers to smoke that cigarette over not smoking it. Despite 
wanting to give in to the impulsive smoking preference, the person may prefer not to have that 
preference for smoking and may therefore act to mitigate the smoking preference. Psychologists 
(e.g., Ainslie, 1975) and economists (e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) have described such 
preferences over preferences using the analogy of multiple selves, such that higher-order selves 
control the behavior of lower-order selves. 
                                                
2 On the other hand, do demonstrations of automaticity in everyday life prove that there is no free will? 
Not necessarily. Even Libet (2002) suggested that we might retain the ability to veto actions that are 
initiated by non-conscious psychological structures. Consistent with this view, making participants aware 
of the potential influence that a stimulus might have is often sufficient to eliminate such non-conscious 
influences and de-automate behavior.7
BSSV distinguish between System 1 (automatic) and System 2 (controlled) processing, 
and link their conception of free will to System 2 processing. However, as the System 1/System 
2 conceptualization lumps together the dichotomies affective/automatic and cognitive/controlled, 
the possibility that affective processing can be an instance of free will is ignored. BSSV give the 
example of consumers who refrain from short-term indulgences for a variety of reasons (i.e., to 
keep to their monthly budgets for instance), and infer that these consumers have free will (p.8). 
But suppose that these very consumers feel bad and want to feel better. Research has shown that 
people sometimes deliberately give in to their short-term urges (they eat fattening snacks, seek 
immediate gratification, or procrastinate) in order to feel better (Tice, Bratslavsky, & 
Baumeister, 2001). Indulging may thus also result from willful, strategic choice (e.g., Kivetz &
Simonson, 2002). This suggests that the multiple-selves analogy may be more appropriate in 
capturing the consumer experience of exercising free will in the face of conflicts of will.
In general, we concur with BSSV that consumers’ belief in free will arises from the 
conscious experience of being tempted by an impulse (system 1) yet not wanting to give in to the 
temptation and of implementing impulse control (system 2). BSSV apply such impulse control to 
a wide array of general response conflicts and describe it as depleting a cognitive resource, or as 
ego-depleting. Even though we agree with BSSV on the general point, we build on much extant 
research on the strategic nature of self-control to suggest that both a more specific view of self-
control problems and a more general conceptualization of self-control strategies are needed.
What Are Self-Control Problems?
We build on Kane’s (1996) view that the indeterminacy of responses to a conflict of will 
that involves one’s duty or long-term self-interest on the one hand and an opposing short-term 
impulse on the other is essential to (experienced) freedom of will. Accordingly, self-control 
problems are response conflicts that involve violations of moral norms and/or self-interest. This 
view of self-control problems is, of course, fundamentally embedded in the story of the original 
sin, it is echoed by Ulysses’s temptation to expose himself to the sirens’ singing, and it also 
characterizes most research on the topic in modern economics and psychology and in 
psychoanalysis (for excellent overviews, see Loewenstein & Elster, 1992; Loewenstein, Read, &
Baumeister, 2003; also, e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Laibson, 1997; 
O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Strotz, 1956; Wertenbroch, 1998).8
BSSV characterize self-control problems much more generally, explicitly using the terms 
self-control and self-regulation interchangeably. To illustrate, research on ego-depletion often 
employs the Stroop task to show that performing one self-regulation task leads to subsequent 
decrements in self-control, thus providing evidence of depletion (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2007;
Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Yet the Stroop task is not a self-control problem as it does not 
involve moral conflict and does not affect a person’s self-interest in any way. Tasks that involve 
low-level response conflicts (e.g., Stroop tasks, trying not to think of white bears, or even trying 
to control neurophysiological reflexes) are similar to making trade-offs among attributes when 
choosing job offers, apartments, or mobile phone providers in that they all involve conflict that 
has to be resolved by invoking an executive control function embedded in system 2. In line with 
much of the extant literature, we prefer to refer to such executive control of response conflicts as 
self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Scheier & Carver, 1988). 
In contrast, we reserve the term self-control only for those specific response conflicts that 
(1) involve intertemporal and/or moral conflict, and that (2) consumers would invariably resolve 
in favor of their short-term impulses in the absence of self-control. These response conflicts are 
typically described by hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O’Donoghue, 2001; Soman et al., 2005) and, at least partially, have been attributed to visceral 
factors (Loewenstein, 1996). This much narrower conceptualization has the advantage of closely 
reflecting both the bulk of the social science literature on self-control problems over the last two 
centuries as well as most people’s intuitive understanding of self-control problems as shaped by 
the fundamental religious and cultural narratives of mankind (e.g., Bhagavad Gita, Thora, 
Odyssey, Bible, Koran). It is the latter feature that is important in the context of belief in free 
will. As we have seen, Kane’s (1996) notion of free will embodies the story of the original sin 
with its fundamental emphasis on moral conflict and temptation versus long-term self-interest. 
Loewenstein’s (1994) analysis of curiosity in terms of time-inconsistency provides an interesting 
and telling illustration of the structural similarity between the original sin (giving in to the 
temptation to acquire knowledge) and modern-day analyses of dynamic inconsistency.
What Are Self-Control Strategies?
Ego-depletion. BSSV’s conceive of self-control strategies as those that require a 
depletable resource. In the context of self-control problems, this resource is perhaps best referred 9
to as willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). In the past decade, dozens of studies have 
documented the so-called ego-depletion effect (for a review, see Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). Yet 
the resource conceptualization of ego-depletion effects continues to evolve. BSSV themselves 
cite a number of studies that demonstrate how depletion effects can be overcome: through
motivation to help others, belief in effort and monetary incentives (Muraven & Slessareva,
2003), implementation intentions (Webb & Sheeran, 2003), thinking about one’s close 
relationships (Stillman, Tice, & Baumeister, 2007), humor (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, &
Muraven, in press), and thinking about one’s life values (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2007). Moreover, 
recent research suggests that depletion effects seem to critically depend on the dissimilarity of 
the control strategies in two sequential self-control situations. Depletion effects were observed if 
the control strategies were dissimilar, but reversed (i.e., self-control improved) if the control 
strategies were similar (Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2007). The authors suggested that the 
recruitment of control strategies is a gradual process characterized by a degree of inertia, and that 
this inertia can explain depletion effects. Because of difficulties switching between control 
strategies, performance at a task involving different control strategies than a previous task will 
suffer. Taken together, those findings seem to cast doubt on whether exerting self-control really 
depletes a resource.
Relatedly, BSSV cite the findings of Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) as evidence of resource 
depletion and impaired self-control. Shiv and Fedorikhin, however, manipulated cognitive load
rather than depletion in their studies (keeping in mind a seven digit number while making 
choices that required self-control). Cognitively loading participants has been a popular means to 
reduce cognitive capacity in the literature on (consumer) decision-making, resulting in similar 
effects as depletion (e.g., Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 2000; Drolet & Luce, 2004). Cognitive load 
puts a constraint on working memory and processing capacity, but it is not clear whether it 
depletes a resource. For example, most cognitive load manipulations in the literature have not 
been applied to self-control problems. This raises the issue of whether depletion is really self-
control specific, or whether it describes a more general form of mental fatigue. Researchers have 
demonstrated depletion for behaviors as diverse as thought suppression (Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998), emotion control (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), response inhibition (Wallace & 
Baumeister, 2002), intellectual performance (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), self-
presentation (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005), and active choice-making (Bruyneel, 10
Dewitte, Vohs, & Warlop, 2006). The depletion effects in these tasks do not seem to involve 
Kane’s (1996) moral or intertemporal self-control conflicts that are essential to the experience of 
free will.
Precommitment. While BSSV and colleagues focus on solving self-control problems by 
(ego-) depleting willpower, it is important to recognize that much research on self-control has 
examined precommitment as a key self-control strategy (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Ariely &
Wertenbroch, 2002; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001; Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Trope & 
Fishbach, 2000; Wertenbroch, 1998, 2003). Precommitment means that a consumer who foresees 
being tempted by a particular stimulus in the future takes measures in the present that will 
prevent him or her from giving in to the future temptation. This strategic foresight, we propose, 
allows consumers to believe in free will—they make plans for curbing anticipated future 
conflicts of will by self-imposing costly constraints at a time when temptation has not overcome 
them yet. 
Ulysses’s strategy of tying himself to the mast to hear the sirens sing without being able 
to give in to the temptation to steer his ship toward them is probably the first example on record. 
In more recent years, other examples have abounded. Much of this work has been theoretical 
(e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001). For instance, Schelling 
(1984) describes how consumers who are afraid of being tempted to hit the snooze button when 
their alarm clock rings in the morning precommit to not being able to give in to that temptation 
by placing the alarm clock at the other side of the bedroom the night before, forcing themselves 
to get out of bed to turn off the alarm in the morning.  But beginning with Wertenbroch (1998), 
empirical evidence of precommitment has been mounting as well in recent years (e.g., 
DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004; Trope & Fishbach, 2000). For example, Wertenbroch (1998) 
showed that consumers with a need for self-control prefer to buy vice products in smaller 
quantities than comparable virtue products, thus rationing their vice consumption. Importantly, 
these consumers forgo quantity discounts for the vice products, paying a small-size premium that 
can be conceived of as a self-control premium and that translates into a smaller price elasticity of 
demand for vices than for virtues. In another demonstration of costly precommitment strategies, 
Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) found that consumers self-impose costly deadlines to mitigate 
their impulses to procrastinate on important yet unpleasant tasks. And recent research by Ashraf, 
Karlan, and Yin (2006) looked at bank customers who were offered voluntary participation in a 11
precommitment savings account. Participants could withdraw their money only after a specific 
date or once they had reached a pre-specified savings goal. After 12 months, average savings 
balances were 81% higher in the precommitment accounts than in regular accounts in a control 
group. 
In sum, we propose that it is not only the effortful exercise of willpower but also this 
willful and strategic precommitment in the face of moral or intertemporal conflicts of will that 
provides consumers with the phenomenological experience of exercising free will. It is in these 
conflicts that consumers experience the indeterminacy that allows them to feel that they are the 
masters of their own destiny.
CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEF IN FREE WILL: WELL-BEING AND CONTROL
Our earlier discussion of incompatibilist theories of free will pointed to the ontological 
relationship between free will and indeterminacy. From a phenomenological perspective, we 
suggest that belief in free will goes hand in hand with belief in indeterminacy. Recent research 
by Vosgerau, Wertenbroch, and Carmon (2006) explored the concept of indeterminacy in the 
context of consumer preferences for watching events live on TV. Controlling for a number of 
other factors, the authors found that these preferences arise when consumers believe the 
broadcast event to be indeterminate, that is, when they believe the event is unfolding in ways that 
have not been decided ex-ante. The indeterminacy of an experience makes it more exciting and 
enjoyable and hence more preferable. Consumers like indeterminacy.
We propose that it is the experienced indeterminacy of alternative decision outcomes in 
situations, in which consumers are faced with conflicts of will and to which they apply willpower 
and precommitment, that provides them with hope for a better life and with the motivation to 
strive for it. Belief in free will is functional; without it, consumers would not be able to feel that 
they can control their environment, with devastating consequences for psychological well-being 
as illustrated by research on learned helplessness (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1995). 
Consequently, consumers report wanting to have choices, and many cannot even imagine not
preferring to have a choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). The ability to choose also increases
intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). The preference for freely choosing is so strong that 
choices are preferred even when the control that they offer is illusionary, as is evidenced by the 12
large body of research on illusion of control (Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). The 
belief in a free will provides consumers with a feeling of stability and control (Bargh, 1997), and 
it enables them to define, and act with, moral responsibility. As Kane (1996) suggested, it is 
essential to striving for, and appreciating, achievement, autonomy, dignity, love, and friendship. 
An interesting field for future research is therefore to empirically explore the 
consequences of believing in free will in more detail. As some initial studies referenced by 
BSSV suggest, believing in free will can lead to less aggressive and more helpful behavior 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2006), and disbelief in free will can increase cheating 
(Vohs & Schooler, 2007). Yet we can also imagine situations, in which belief in free will may
have less favorable consequences. For example, freedom of choice does not always make 
consumers happier. Even though consumers may believe ex-ante that more choice is better, 
resulting post-choice satisfaction and happiness are often greater in restricted choice situations 
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Moreover, believing in determinism might reduce negative 
consequences of negative emotions such as anger, frustration, rage, jealousy, and envy, leading 
consumers to be more accepting of the circumstances that bring these about. 
In conclusion, belief in free will is an exciting and yet to be fully explored phenomenon, 
both for consumer psychology and for psychology in general. We hope that our discussion of 
BSSV’s thought-provoking article has highlighted some interesting facets of both the origins as 
well as the consequences of this phenomenon.13
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